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Built on Mexico's Yucatan peninsula between 700 and 900 A.D., the
ancient Mayan city of Oxhintok once sheltered an estimated 50,000 peo-
ple.' For unknown reasons, the Mayans abandoned the city some 1,000
years ago and the dense Central American forest soon buried all evidence
of its urban form. When archaeologists first discovered the lost city, they
eagerly embarked on its excavation, excited by the prospect of uncovering
a rich trove of cultural and historic artifacts. Instead they found desola-
tion. Lured by the promise of hidden treasure, looters in search of antiq-
uities had dynamited buildings and sliced valuable stelae2 into pieces for
clandestine shipment to the United States.
As Oxhintok illustrates, the lucrative trade in stolen antiquities3 fuels
the destruction of ancient civilizations' archaeological records.4 Each time
an antiquity is discovered and removed from a site without first being
studied by anthropologists, the historical record that can be constructed
through scientific evaluation of the piece in situ is destroyed. This Note
examines legal methods that can most efficiently halt the continued devas-
tation of archaeological sites.
Artifact-rich nations, the majority of which are developing countries,
cannot protect their archaeological sites.' Many sites are located in remote
regions and these nations lack the sophisticated customs services or police
forces necessary to prevent looting. In an attempt to halt the theft and
subsequent export of antiquities for sale in the United States, Europe and
the Far East, many artifact-rich countries have passed legislation declar-
ing that all antiquities of a specified age, whether below or above the
1. Yates, Treasures of the Maya, reprinted in Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act: Hearings on H.R. 5643 and S. 2261 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings].
2. These are stone slabs, "[olften 7 to 8 feet high and weighing several tons each,. . .[their in-
scriptions contain the] message of a vanished people, bearing names and dates and histories." Id. at
24.
3. As used in this Note, an antiquity is an object of cultural significance, generally more than 200
years old.
4. See K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAsT (1973); Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175
SCIENCE 263 (1972).
5. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275, 289-94 (1982)
(discussing extent of looting in South America, Europe and Asia). For a discussion of efforts to halt
the trade see infra notes 21-26 and accompanying texct.
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ground, are owned by the nation.6 These "umbrella statutes" protect a
source country's legal right to compel the return of nationalized artifacts 7
from collectors and dealers in the United States in common law replevin
actions." In addition, by clarifying that these antiquities are national prop-
erty, the source countries subject purchasers of these artifacts in the
United States to prosecution under criminal statutes that prohibit the im-
portation of stolen property.9 Whether these umbrella statutes constitute
valid declarations of ownership, however, remains a subject of considera-
ble debate in the United States.
This Note proposes that United States courts recognize the ownership
claims of artifact-rich nations.1" The enforcement of umbrella statutes is
the most efficient means of limiting the continued destruction of archaeo-
logical data that the trade in antiquities promotes. Purchasers of antiqui-
ties, unlike the objects they acquire, are not hidden. For this reason, it is
more effective to police the activity of antiquity purchasers than to protect
archaeological sites. Strict enforcement of legal sanctions against collectors
and dealers of antiquities will decrease the demand for new antiquities
and reduce the economic incentive for looting. 1
Section I of this Note documents the mechanics and magnitude of the
trade in stolen antiquities and its destructive effects on cultural heritage
and scientific knowledge. Section II analyzes the current proliferation of
foreign umbrella statutes and the effectiveness of responsive American ju-
dicial and legislative remedies to curtail the illicit trade in antiquities. Sec-
tion III offers economic and legal justifications for upholding umbrella
statutes. Finally, Section IV outlines limits to the effectiveness of enforcing
umbrella statutes as a means of halting the theft of antiquities.
6. This legislation typically establishes that all antiquities are government property. Even those
not owned in a traditional sense, for example undiscovered antiquities in which no one has a posses-
sory interest, are nationalized. If a developer discovers an antiquity during the excavation of a new
building's foundation, the artifact is government property regardless of who owns the land and in
spite of the fact that no one knew that the antiquity was located at this site prior to the excavation.
Umbrella statutes are discussed in greater detail at infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
7. Only antiquities taken out of the country after the date the umbrella statute became effective
could be considered stolen property.
8. "Replevin is a proceeding by which the owner. . .[of] chattel taken or detained seeks to recover
possession of that specific chattel. . . ." 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin § 2 (1973). For a discussion of the
common law theft rule see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
9. The relevant statute is the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982). See
discussion infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
10. Other countries' continued importation of stolen antiquities will limit the deterrent effect of
the United States' recognition of umbrella statutes. Since the United States is one of the major import-
ers of antiquities, the effect on the market should still be significant. See 1978 Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Mark Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
11. This proposal is not intended to serve as a legal basis for countries to seek the large scale
return of antiquities that have already been stolen. See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
Rather, it offers a legal mechanism to limit the continued theft of artifacts and the irreplaceable loss of
historical and cultural information that occurs when new artifacts are stolen.
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1. THE TRADE IN STOLEN ANTIQUITIES
The trade in stolen antiquities is flourishing. 2 The bulk of this trade
originates in developing countries and ends with sales in New York,
London, Geneva and Tokyo. Collectors, dealers and museums, generating
the demand for these treasures, display a tragic combination of artistic
sophistication and an imperialistic attitude that developed countries have a
right to hoard the world's antiquities.Y3 Instead of acknowledging that
their demand for artistic treasures encourages the looting of archaeological
sites, these collectors justify their actions by arguing that art-importing
nations can better preserve a foreign country's heritage than can the coun-
try of origin.Y
4
In fact, far from preserving objects of historical importance, the market
demand for antiquities finances the looting of archaeological sites.15 A
study in Belize revealed that "[l]ooting to supply the art markets of the art
consuming nations, especially the United States, has been responsible for
the greatest portion of the damage to sites"'" in that country. In Central
12. See B. BURNHAM, ART THEFTr: iTS SCOPE, ITS IMPACT, AND ITS CONTROL (1978); Ford,
Looting the Past: An International Scandal, 14 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 510 (1973); Carley,
Stolen Treasure: Archaeological Objects Smuggled at Brisk Rate as Their Prices Soar, WALL ST. J.,
June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1. Trade in illicitly acquired art and artifacts is estimated to exceed S billion
annually. Lowenthal, Museum Repose Bill Vetoed in Albany, IFARREPORTS, July-Aug. 1986, at 3, 4
(quoting Marvin Stone, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency, in letter to New York
Governor Mario Cuomo). Commentators often note that trade in stolen antiquities is second only to
drug smuggling in terms of its importance as an international crime. See, e.g., A Special Agent Speaks
Out, ART & ANTIQUITIES, Nov. 1986, at 59 (Kocaka interview).
13. Andre Emmerich, an antiquities dealer in New York City, typifies this perspective. He be-
lieves that "this country more than any other has a special claim to the arts of all mankind ... " K.
MEYER, supra note 4, at 28.
14. As one antiquities dealer testified before Congress: "The United States has been the greatest
preserver of cultural properties from every country in the world, even in the days when these 'cultural
properties' were considered cultural garbage in their countries of origin." 1978 Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 49 (testimony of art dealer Peter Marks). Furthermore, collectors contend that antiq-
uities bought and sold on the market are often commonplace items that deserve no special protection.
As Emmerich testified, these artifacts "are generally remarkably repetitive . . . .Most early tombs
contain the cultural equivalents of Coca Cola bottles, Seven-Up cans and mass-produced rosary beads
.... What would be invaluable and instructive additions to the collections of many American muse-
ums are simply left unseen and endangered on local premises supposedly dedicated to their preserva-
tion." Id. at 51.
15. See generally Bator, supra note 5, at 291 ("[I]ncrease of interest among art collectors ....
has fueled an intense world-wide search for such [primitive and ethnographic] art.") (footnote omit-
ted); K. MEYER, supra note 4, at 139 (until recently most Indian idols left unharmed, but as value of
Indian art escalated, theft of idols became commonplace); Shirey, Norton Simon Bought Smuggled
Idol, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1973, at 1, col. 2 (Simon claimed to have spent $15-16 million on Asian
art, most of which was smuggled). The high prices that these objects fetch reflect the market's
strength. See Dunn, Personal Business, Bus. Wx., Jan. 20, 1986, at 93 (pre-Columbian work re-
cently sold for S175,000); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at C18, col. 6 (Mayan vase sold in 1984 for
$515,000); Wellborn, When Greedy Collectors Plunder the Past, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
March 4, 1985, at 79 (Mayan vase may cost $15,000; Mayan monolith may cost S125,000).
16. Gutchen, The Destruction of Archaeological Resources in Belize, Central America, 10 J.
FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 217, 227 (1983). Gutchen's survey revealed that 74.3% of all major ceremonial
centers in Belize had been looted. Id. at 222. For a more general discussion of how looting is financed,
see K. MEYER, supra note 4, at 156-63.
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America alone, millions of dollars worth of cultural patrimony is stolen
every year.1
7
A country can retrieve the physical forms of its cultural heritage by
recovering artifacts that have been removed. 8 The damage inflicted by
looters on the body of scientific knowledge that undiscovered artifacts re-
present, however, is irreparable.19 Anthropological archaeologists depend
on undisturbed sites for noting and calculating the precise relationship
among artifacts.20 By recording the amount of a certain fragment type
within a room, or the spatial distribution of remains, much can be learned
about the habits and culture of ancient civilizations. When looters unearth
antiquities, anthropological data, in many cases the only historical record
available for source countries, is lost forever.
Artifact-rich nations are in a complex predicament. In the face of the
enormous pressure that the market demand for their cultural past creates,
these countries have had little success preventing the looting of archaeo-
logical sites. Physical protection of sites is simply not feasible.2" Police,
17. It is estimated that more than $30 million of antiquities are stolen from Costa Rica every
year. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Rep. Abner Mikva). The value of
artifacts removed from the Yucatan (Mexico) and Guatemala ranges between S20-$50 million a year.
1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (Yates reprint). For a discussion of the extent of looting
in coastal Ecuador, see Damp, Salvaging Sites and Specimens: To Fake or Not to Fake, 11 J. FIELD
ARCHAEOLOGY 427 (1984).
18. For example, in 1973, Peace Corps volunteers located the Afo-A-Kom, a statue said to em-
body the soul of the Kom, a Cameroonian tribe, in a New York art gallery. The piece was of such
importance to the Kom that its discovery led to an international incident and the statue's eventual
return. DuBoff & Allan, The Afo-A-Kom: A Plea to Save A Cultural Heritage, in ART LAW: Do-
MESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 425 (1975); see also Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1881 (1985) (discussing efforts of Greek government to have British Museum
return Elgin Marbles, sculptures taken from Parthenon by Earl of Elgin in early 1800's).
19. Looters systematically destroy entire archaeological sites. The professional looter comes
equipped with portable generators, prefabricated huts, power tools and metal detectors. The financial
resources, sophistication and brutality of looters are legendary. Eric von Euh, a Yale archaeologist,
recounted how looters financed by a New York art dealer built landing strips in the jungles of Central
America, and flew in old DC-3 cargo planes to remove artifacts. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 25 (Yates reprint).
20.
[Ojur archaeological resources are not renewable. Once a site has been worked over by looters
in order to remove a few salable objects, the fragile fabric of its history is largely destroyed.
Changes in soil color, the traces of ancient floors and fires, the imprint of vanished textiles and
foodstuffs, the relation between one object and another, and the position of a skeleton-all of
these sources of fugitive information are ignored and obliterated by archaeological looters ...
The collector buys a beautiful object about which he knows virtually nothing, and no one ever
mentions to him the devastation that was created in order to deliver it.
Coggins, supra note 4, at 263.
21. Artifact-rich nations have thousands of existing archaeological sites that must be protected
from looting. The local police forces are not able to ensure that these sites are not harmed by looters.
1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 22 (testimony of Rep. Abner Mikva); K. MEYER, supra note
4, at 154 (describing limited finances to protect archaeological resources); Relating to Stolen Archaeo-
logical Property: Hearings on § 605 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) (testimony of Dr. Albert A. Denkin, Jr., Society for
American Archaeology) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearings]; UNITED NATIONS SOCIAL DEFENCE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PUB. No. 13, THE PROTECTION OF THE ARTISTIC AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL
HERITAGE 221 (1976) (discussing protection of Indian temples).
Even the United States cannot protect its own archaeological treasures. A rise in the market price of
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customs agencies and other enforcement units are understaffed and poorly
paid.22 Furthermore, some of the most damaging looting occurs in previ-
ously unknown sites, such as Oxhintok, which are not discovered until it
is too late. These sites cannot be protected.
Unable to police sites, many source countries enacted export regulations
that prohibit the removal of all antiquities.2 3 Developing countries, how-
ever, cannot police their borders. Many importing countries, such as the
United States, do not enforce foreign nations' export laws.2" Thus, in spite
of the efforts of developing countries, the trade in stolen antiquities contin-
ues to thrive.
Artifact-rich nations realize that deterrents must be placed on purchas-
ers in order to slow the trade in antiquities. To accomplish this, many
source nations have passed umbrella statutes which declare that all antiq-
uities of a certain age or older (whether discovered or still buried, whether
held in public or private hands) are national property.2 5 In addition, they
have required that anyone who already possesses artifacts register them
with the government.26 This legislation transforms the character of antiq-
Native American artifacts (a ceremonial basket used by Hopi Indians can be worth $120,000) has
resulted in increased looting in the Southwest. See Goodwin, Raiders of the Sacred Sites, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 65. As in Central America, in spite of protective legislation, the
trade continues. Currently it is estimated that 80-90% of all sites in the Southwest have been looted.
Id. at 66.
22. A smuggler wishing to export an artifact can often obtain an export certificate illegally or
bribe a customs official at the border. See L. DuBOFF, THE DESKEBOOK OF ART LAw 71 (1977)
(some people in underdeveloped countries willing to sacrifice cultural heritage for improved standard
of living); K. MEYER, supra note 4, at 140 (guards at Indian temples paid less than 50 cents per day);
see United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (officers received bribes in
export of artifacts); L. DuBOFF, supra, at 109-14 (discussion of theft of an important Indian idol,
Swapuram Nataraja, for which false export permits were received). See also Ferretti, Owner Re-
turning Statue to Kom, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1973, at 35, col. 2 (two Cameroonians reportedly
accepted $20 in bribes to allow export of Afo-A-Kom).
23. See 1&2 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
(1984); S. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL
PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 108-17 (1978); 1 L. PROTT & G. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE
CULTURAL HERITAGE (1984); B. BURNHAM, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1975).
24. Under customary international law, a United States importer of objects illegally exported from
a foreign nation will not be prosecuted. For a discussion of customary international law on this subject
see S. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 106-08. No United States court or legislative authority has ever
recognized a cause of action solely for possession of illegally exported objects. See Bator, supra note 5,
at 287 & n.30. But see exception under International Convention discussed infra note 36.
25. These decrees apply to artifacts currently in collections as well as works that have not been
discovered. The prospective dimension of these statutes is problematic. Countries can easily demon-
strate ownership of objects that, prior to nationalization, were located in the homes of citizens. The
registration of these artifacts would define the country's claim. It is more difficult to show that arti-
facts unearthed after nationalization occurred are owned by the country.
26. Many countries have passed umbrella ownership statutes for at least some types of antiquities.
In Mexico, the first declarations of national ownership of antiquities were passed in 1897, Article 1 of
the Law on Archaeological Monuments, May 11, 1897, Diario oficial de 11 de Mayo de 1897, see
XIV Anuario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia 323 [1897] (declaring archaeological monuments prop-
erty of the nation). More expansive legislation was passed in 1930 (Law on the Protection and Con-
servation of Monuments and Natural Beauty, 58 D.O. 7 (1930)), 1934 (Law for the Protection and
Preservation of Archaeological and Historic Monuments, Typical Towns and Places of Scenic Beauty,
82 D.O. 152 (1934)), and 1970 (Federal Law Concerning Cultural Patrimony of the Nation, 303
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uities, previously controlled only by export regulations not enforced by the
United States, into stolen property that is subject to United States common
law and statutory regulations.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRADE IN STOLEN PROPERTY: THE
COMMON LAW RULE AND THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT
The common law theft rule and the National Stolen Property Act
(NSPA)2" restrict the trade in stolen property. Foreign nations can bring
common law replevin actions in United States courts against any holder of
stolen property, whether or not she is a good faith purchaser. The com-
mon law rule, as codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),"8 is
that a purchaser cannot acquire good title from a thief. This rule places
all liability on purchasers. A buyer might pay for an item not knowing it
is stolen and then if the original owner locates the object, the purchaser
must return it to the original owner. If the purchaser of the stolen goods
cannot locate the party from whom she bought the object, she will not be
compensated for her loss.29 In short, even good faith purchasers, who have
no idea that an item was stolen, may have to forfeit the property.30
The NSPA prohibits the transport, receipt, concealment, and sale of
D.O. 8 (1970)). On May 6, 1972 the Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monu-
ments and Zones, 312 D.O. 16 (1972), was enacted. Relevant articles include Article 27, which pro-
vides that "[a]rchaeological monuments, movables and immovables, are the inalienable and impre-
scriptible property of the Nation," and Article 28 which provides that "[mlovable and immovable
objects, product of the cultures prior to the establishment of the Spanish culture in the National
Territory,. . . are archaeological monuments." Furthermore, Article 22 required individuals to regis-
ter monuments "of their ownership."
In Guatemala, all "[airchaeological monuments and relics" are "assets of the state." GUAT. CONST.
art. 121(0.
Other Latin American countries which have passed umbrella statutes include Belize, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela. See Note, Harmo-
nious Meeting: The McClain Decision and the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 311, 329 n.135 (citing specific laws recognized by the United States). The State Depart-
ment also has mentioned the following nations as those which have passed national ownership stat-
utes: Haiti, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Turkey, Algeria, Liberia, Mauritania,
Nigeria, Tanzania and Tunisia. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 49 (testimony of Ely Mau-
rer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982).
28. U.C.C. §§ 2-401, 2-402, 2-403 (1977); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 550-75, 798-809 (2d ed. 1980).
29. For an argument defending the common law's efficiency see Weinberg, Sales Law Economics,
and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 569 (1980). But see Murray, Sale in Market Overt,
9 INT'L & ComP. L. Q. 24 (1960) (arguing that favoring owner's claim over innocent purchaser is
injurious to commerce).
30. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1964) (denying defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss), enforced, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966) (denying motion to set aside
judgment against defendant), affd as modified, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967) (per
curiam) (modifying damages award), rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969)
(good faith purchaser of painting by Marc Chagall, taken from original owner by Nazi troops in
1941, forced to forfeit work to original owner); Johnny Dell, Inc. v. New York State Police, 84 Misc.
2d 360, 375 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1975) (good faith purchaser of automobile from individual who purchased
car from thief did not obtain title and must return vehicle to original owner).
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goods worth $5,000 or more, "knowing the same to be stolen."31 Thus, an
individual who transports, sells or purchases an antiquity must know that
it is stolen in order to be prosecuted for a violation of the NSPA.3 2
The NSPA provides an effective means of prosecuting dealers in stolen
antiquities and of obtaining the return of artifacts to the source country.3
Common law replevin actions provide an even more straightforward
means of recovering stolen antiquities.34 Foreign governments and citizens
have routinely succeeded in obtaining the return of objects that fall within
the traditional definition of "stolen" in common law replevin actions.35
The critical limiting factor of both the common law and the NSPA is that
they apply to antiquities illegally removed from a foreign country and
imported into the United States only if the property falls within the
United States' legal definition of "stolen." Thus, the effectiveness of these
laws in slowing the theft of antiquities hinges on that definition."
31. See supra note 27.
32. The scienter requirement is not an insurmountable barrier. If the accused is aware that the
goods were stolen from somewhere, conviction is possible; she need not be aware of exactly which
foreign law proclaimed the artifacts national property. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d
1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1974).
33. The NSPA is an attractive remedy for foreign nations. Violators of this statute are prosecuted
by the United States. Following a criminal conviction under the NSPA, the disposition of the artifacts
is determined in a forfeiture proceeding. If the United States wins custody of the artifact, the return of
the object to the foreign government is usually negotiated. See United States v. One Eighteenth Cen-
tury Colombian Monstrance, 797 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1986); see also L. DuBOFF, supra note 22, at
96 (discussion of stolen artifacts returned to Guatemala). If the United States brings an NSPA action
the cost of prosecution is paid by the United States government. The NSPA's criminal sanctions are a
greater deterrent than replevin, which simply forces the holder of the stolen work to return it to the
country of origin.
34. A replevin suit may be brought without the United States government's participation and
requires no negotiation for return of the object. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate scienter and the coun-
try of origin may be more capable than the United States of determining which objects have been
stolen from within its borders.
35. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 678 F.2d 1150
(2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit affirmed a district court's determination that two priceless Durer
paintings, stolen from a castle in Germany and purchased by a Brooklyn collector from a United
States serviceman, belonged to the Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, a museum owned and operated by
the East German government. "In applying the New York rule that a purchaser cannot acquire good
title from a thief, New York courts do not concern themselves with the question of where the theft
took place, but simply whether one took place." Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 846. Accord Mucha v.
King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (Czechoslovak citizen brought successful action for return of
painting illegally converted by Chicago gallery and subsequently purchased by defendant for
$35,000); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (German citizen from whom
Monet painting had been stolen obtained this work from defendant, who purchased painting in good
faith from Wildenstein gallery), rev'd, Nos. 87-7392. 87-7402 (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Usapp file) (DeWeerth failed to exercise due diligence in seeking painting's return).
Civil suits have also been initiated for the return of antiquities stolen from museums and monu-
ments., Guatemala instituted a civil action in California in 1970 for the return of a Mayan stela stolen
from a site that had been carefully catalogued in that country. See L. DuBOFF, supra note 22, at 91.
The United States instituted criminal action against the thief under the NSPA. Id. See also 2 F.
FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. BIERDERMAN, ART LAW § 11.2.5 (1986) (discussing suit brought by
Rumanian Government against private gallery and museum seeking return of El Greco painting)
[hereinafter FELDMAN & WElL]; L. DuBOFF, supra note 22, at 110-14 (discussing civil suit brought
by Indian Government for return of stolen idol).
36. An alternative means of limiting the trade in stolen antiquities is the use of treaties and
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A. Can Newly Discovered Antiquities Be Considered Stolen?
Historically, property was defined as stolen when the original holder
was deprived of rights of ownership.3 7 In the case of an ancient urn, the
owner may well be buried in it. There are no traditional ownership rights
in this situation.
A nation's claim to own its cultural patrimony is not equivalent to the
ownership interest in more traditional forms of property. When a country
claims ownership of an antiquity for sale in a New York gallery, the
country cannot produce the type of evidence of ownership that is available
to the owner of a stolen car. For the latter, the registration certificate the
purchaser holds, the time spent driving to work and the receipt given the
owner by the dealership for the vehicle, all define the buyer's ownership.
A country that declares itself owner of undocumented antiquities does not
possess similar tangible proof. There are no registration permits and prior
to the discovery of the antiquity its existence may not have been known.
In fact, the antiquities are often discovered by the thieves.
international conventions. The most significant legislation is the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1982). This implemented the UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972). This statute provides a mecha-
nism for limited enforcement by the Customs Service of a foreign nation's export laws. A foreign
country that wants to avail itself of the CPIA's protection must request United States assistance and
demonstrate: (1) that archaeological and ethnological material is in danger of pillage; (2) that the
country has made due efforts to prevent such theft; and (3) that any United States import restrictions
will be applied in concert with other nations, through bilateral or multilateral agreements. The CPIA
is discussed in detail in Note, supra note 26.
Given the reluctance of other artifact-importing nations to limit this trade, implementation of im-
port restrictions is unlikely. To date, only Canada and El Salvador have made requests in accordance
with this legislation. The U.S. has yet to act on either of these petitions. See IFARREPORTS, June
1987, at 6.
The strict enforcement of customs regulations also provides a means to limit the trade in stolen
antiquities. In accordance with prohibitions against smuggling, an importer of merchandise contrary
to law is subject to criminal sanctions and forfeiture of such merchandise to the United States, 18
U.S.C. § 545 (1982). Since the United States prohibits transport of stolen goods worth more than
$5,000, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982), a customs inspector who suspects that valuable artifacts have been
stolen can hold such goods until title has been determined. The Customs Service frequently found that
in an effort to mask the theft of valuable antiquities, imported items are incorrectly described and
undervalued in violation of customs regulations. Goods that are falsely categorized or not declared are
subject to forfeiture and the importer is liable for fines that equal the value of the imported object, 19
U.S.C. § 1497 (1982). Items seized by customs are usually returned to the country of origin. See, e.g.,
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, SupP. No. 3280,01, SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN AR-
TIFACTS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (Oct. 5, 1982); Mitgang, Recovered Peruvian Art
Raises Cultural Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1982, at C15, col. 1 (discussing settlement between art
dealer David Bernstein and United States Customs Office result of which was return of 700 artifacts
to Peru). However, because artifacts are hard to detect and the veracity of their descriptions are
difficult to assess, the Customs Service cannot prevent the entry of many illicit imports into the United
States market. See, e.g., A Special Agent Speaks Out, supra note 12, at 59 (discussing investigatory
work of customs agent specializing in art theft).
37. "Stealing . . . is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person
obtains that which rightfully belongs to another, and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership . . . ." Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1938). This definition was cited with
approval in United States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 741 (1944).
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Under an expansive definition of ownership and theft,38 if the buried
urn was discovered and removed by a huaguero,39 smuggled to the United
States, sold to a gallery, and purchased by a private collector or museum,
the artifact would be considered stolen property even though the tradi-
tional owner had long since disappeared.40
Such broad definitions of "ownership" and "stolen" need to be accepted
by the courts for the common law and the NSPA to assist countries vic-
timized by looters. Umbrella statutes provide precisely these broad defini-
tions of ownership and theft. The continued theft of new artifacts will be
slowed if United States courts recognize that umbrella statutes are legiti-
mate declarations of ownership and that any antiquity illegally removed
from these countries is stolen.4' To date, courts have applied an expansive
definition of ownership to antiquities. This interpretation is threatened,
however, by legislative efforts to impose a narrow definition of ownership
on imported antiquities.
B. Judicial Interpretation
A United States court first upheld the validity of an umbrella owner-
ship statute in United States v. Hollinshead.42 Hollinshead was convicted
of violating the NSPA for stealing Machaquila Stela II from Guatemala.
Under a Guatemalan ownership statute, the country was the owner of the
Stela. In upholding his conviction, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that all the
NSPA required was that Hollinshead knew that the Stela was stolen. It
was not necessary to show that he was aware of applicable Guatemalan
law.4" The presence of Machaquila Stela II in the jungles of Guatemala
38. "Stolen" has no accepted common law definition. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407,
411 (1957) (discussing meaning of word "stolen" in 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1982)); Zerbst, 99 F.2d at
565. Furthermore, stolen is not a "term of art." Turley, 352 U.S. at 412 (quoting Boone v. United
States, 235 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1956)). In cases decided after Turley, courts have interpreted
"stolen" broadly. See United States v. Vicars, 465 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1972) (defendant who fraudu-
lently traded non-airworthy airplane for airworthy airplane found to have "stolen" the latter); United
States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966) (photocopies that re-
vealed technical data from documents were "stolen").
39. Huaguero is a Peruvian word used to describe those who plunder tombs and loot archaeologi-
cal sites. K. MEYER, supra note 4, at 132.
40. A country can claim to own as yet undiscovered artifacts. The United States claims ownership
of Indian artifacts that have not been unearthed. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Simi-
larly, nations throughout the world claim ownership of undiscovered natural resources. See infra note
84.
41. Since a source country's ownership in antiquities is not equivalent to a purchaser's interest in
more traditional forms of property, limits should be imposed on the enforcement of foreign nations'
umbrella statutes. At a minimum, United States courts should only recognize the blanket ownership
statutes of those countries which strictly enforce these laws within their own borders. As discussed in
Section III, infra p.477, there are legal and economic rationales for why, in instances when umbrella
ownership statutes are consistently applied by a foreign country, they should be recognized by United
States courts.
42. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). Clive Hollinshead, a dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts, was
prosecuted for conspiring to transport and transporting stolen property in violation of the NSPA.
43. Following Hollinshead's conviction under the NSPA the disposition of the artifact was deter-
mined in a forfeiture proceeding. United States v. One Pre-Columbian Artifact, No. CV73-2349-FW
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had been documented prior to the theft.44 This documentation, in conjunc-
tion with Guatemala's umbrella ownership statute, removed all doubt that
the work was owned by Guatemala. Since artifacts are rarely catalogued
with such precision, however, the court's holding had limited relevance to
the trade in antiquities.
In United States v. McClain,"' the Fifth Circuit considered more fully
the question of whether an artifact can be considered stolen if its owner-
ship is based solely on a national government's umbrella ownership stat-
ute."6 McClain and her co-defendants were arrested for transporting and
receiving stolen property in violation of the NSPA. They had attempted to
sell pre-Columbian artifacts to the Mexican Cultural Institute in San
Antonio, Texas.47 The basis of Mexico's claim of ownership was its um-
brella ownership statutes. 8
The defendants did not deny that the artifacts had been illegally ex-
ported from Mexico. Thus a key question facing the court was whether
the illegal export of these objects from a country with a blanket ownership
statute was sufficient evidence of theft.4 9 In Hollinshead the court's find-
ing was confirmed by evidence that this exact Stela had been catalogued
while still in the Guatemalan forest. The disputed artifacts in McClain
had not been previously documented.50 The court stated that "a declara-
tion of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an
article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered 'stolen,'
within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act."5" Further, it
held that Mexico's umbrella statutes,52 combined with laws that restricted
the export of artifacts, were sufficient authority for bringing and winning
an action under the NSPA 3
McClain illustrates how ownership statutes should work: A foreign
country with an umbrella statute notifies the United States government
that an antiquity sold in the United States has been illegally exported, is
(C.D. Cal. 1975). The Court granted summary judgment to the United States and the artifact was
subsequently returned to Guatemala in accordance with an exchange agreement between the Guate-
malan Government and the Los Angeles County Museum. L. DuBOFF, supra note 22, at 96, 981.
44. Against all odds, a prospective purchaser of the Stela showed pictures of this work to an
archaeologist, Ian Graham, who had studied this exact Stela in Guatemala. Graham immediately
realized that the artifact being offered for sale had been stolen. L. DuBOFF, supra note 22, at 91.
45. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.) [hereinafter McClain f], reh'g denied per
curiam, 551 F.2d 52 (1977); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.) [hereinafter McClain
III, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
46. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1000-03.
47. The NSPA has been consistently applied to goods stolen in foreign countries and then im-
ported into the United States. See McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 994.
48. See supra note 26.
49. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 994-97.
50. Id. at 992.
51. Id. at 1000-01 (footnote omitted).
52. The court concluded that in 1972 the Mexican government extended national ownership to all
pre-Columbian art. In so holding, it reversed the lower court's finding that Mexico had owned all
pre-Columbian art since 1897. Id. at 1000.
53. Id. at 1001.
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not properly registered, and is therefore stolen property. The country also
asserts that such property would be considered stolen if located inside as
well as outside of the nation's border. The United States government, rec-
ognizing the ownership statute, prosecutes the art dealer for theft under
the NSPA. Finally, the United States courts recognize the ownership laws
and punish those individuals who have knowingly received or transported
the stolen property. Once these umbrella statutes are recognized, foreign
countries can seek the return of antiquities from buyers in common law
replevin actions regardless of whether these buyers knew the objects to be
stolen.
C. Legislative Response
Legal commentators and legislators have condemned the McClain deci-
sion.54 They argue that recognition by U.S. courts of umbrella ownership
statutes places too much risk on purchasers. 55 Further, McClain has en-
gendered a broad-based effort to codify a narrow interpretation of "own-
ership" and "stolen" that protects purchasers. Legislation to reverse the
holding of the court in McClain was introduced in the 97th, 98th and
99th Congresses.
In 1985, two bills were introduced to limit the impact of McClain. Sen-
ator Moynihan proposed a bill to amend the NSPA so that it would not
apply to artifacts whose ownership is based solely on a nation's declara-
tion that such objects are its property.5" Senator Mathias introduced the
54. Several bills have been introduced to reverse the McClain decision. See S. 1523, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 10,288 (1985); S. 605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 2611 (1985);
S. 1559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 9343 (1983); S. 2963, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. 12,418 (1982); Cultural Property Repose Act: Hearings on S. 1523 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) [hereinafter 1986 Senate Hearings]; 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 21; 1978 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1.
New York has also introduced legislation to limit the impact of McClain. S. 3273, 208th Leg., 1985
(bill recalled after Attorney General opposed); A. 11462, 209th Leg., 1986 (vetoed by Governor
Cuomo on July 28, 1986); Bator, supra note 5, at 350-54; Fitzpatrick, A Wayward Course: The
Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural Properties, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 857 (1983);
McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs and Congress, 15 N.Y.U. J. INr'L. L. & POL. 813 (1983);
Note, United States v. Hollinshead: A New Leap In Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Laws,
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 149 (inaugural issue Spring 1977); Note, Art Theft: National
Stolen Property Act Applied to Nationalized Mexican Pre-Columbian Artifacts-United States v.
McClain, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 569 (1978).
55. This analysis overlooks the theory behind the common law rule: ensuring that a purchaser can
never obtain good title from a thief is an effective means of deterring theft. For a discussion of the
theft rule see A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 476-79 (1982). It is without
force, then, for critics of McClain to urge the reversal of this decision on the grounds that it places
excessive liability on purchasers. Liability for purchasers of stolen property is not new. The only real
question is whether an antiquity that a source country claims to own by virtue of an umbrella statute,
that is unearthed and exported into this country, should be considered stolen property by United
States courts.
56. Legislation has sought to exclude from the NSPA:
archaeological or ethnological materials taken from a foreign country where - (1) the claim of
ownership is based only upon - (A) a declaration by the foreign country of national ownership
of the material; or (B) other acts by the foreign country which are intended to establish owner-
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Cultural Property Repose Act.5" This bill proposed a five-year federal
statute of limitations on claims brought for the recovery of stolen archaeo-
logical or ethnological material held in the United States. Additionally, the
legislation proposed a two-year statute of limitations on stolen antiquities
held by recognized museums, religious or secular monuments, or similar
institutions, provided that the objects had been exhibited or their presence
made known through publication, cataloguing or otherwise.5
Efforts to limit the McClain decision have come from the states as well.
Individual states have different statutes of limitation for stolen art.59 In
New York, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until after the
purchaser refuses the owner's demand for the object's return.6" Legislation
was introduced in New York in 1985 and 1986 that would have created
an exception to the demand and refusal rule for museums that purchase
antiquities.61 The bill provided for a three-year statute of limitations that
would start to run as soon as the object was stolen. In addition, the bill
did not require a "demand" on the part of the owner if the museum pub-
lished notice of the acquisition in its bulletin, displayed the object for at
least twelve months, and noted the object in the museum's catalogue for
three years. It would be difficult for an artifact-rich nation to locate stolen
objects within the statute of limitations. In many cases, years pass before
ship of the material and which amount only to a functional equivalent of a declaration of
national ownership; (2) the alleged act of stealing, converting, or taking is based only upon an
illegal export of the material from the foreign country ...
S. 605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 2611-12 (1985).
57. S. 1523, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 10,288 (1985). Apparently, a private collector
retained the Houston law firm, Vinson & Elkins, to draft the bill and seek support for it. Those
testifying in favor of this legislation included the directors of the St. Louis Art Museum and the
Houston Museum of Fine Arts. Herscher, Senate Holds Hearings on Cultural Property Repose Act,
13 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 332 (1986).
58. This legislation "would override the law of New York and other jurisdictions with respect to
suits brought by foreign governments . . . to recover stolen cultural items." 1986 Senate Hearings,
supra note 54, at 22 (statement of Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State). Sena-
tor Bentsen argued that the bill was a necessary response to attempts by foreign governments to
circumvent the Texas statute of limitations. As an example he cited the recently dismissed case
brought against the Kimbell Art Museum by the Rumanian government for the return of two El
Greco paintings. Rumania claimed that the works had been stolen from the country in the 1940's.
The Kimbell Museum purchased them in 1977. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986, at C15, col. 3.
Foreign countries have recently increased their efforts to seek the return of cultural property. See
Collectors or looters?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1987 (discussing recent efforts by Turkey and Ecuador to
seek return of cultural property); Crossette, Thais Accuse U.S. in Loss of Temple Art, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1988 (recent efforts of Thai Government to seek return of stolen antiquities). In light of this
increased vigilance , support for a federal statute of limitations is likely to increase.
59. See 1986 Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 102-09.
60. The New York statute of limitations is discussed in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1982). New Jersey has adopted a "discovery rule" under
which the cause of action in a replevin suit only accrues when the owner "knew, or reasonably should
have known ... the possessor" of the stolen objects. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405
A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
61. These statutes were sponsored by the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Lowenthal, IFAR Op-
poses N.Y. Bill Instituting Three-Year Limit on Suits to Recover Stolen Art, IFARREPORTS, Oct.-
Nov. 1985, at 3.
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the loss of the artifact is discovered. Publication in a museum bulletin
would not help these countries.62
Private collectors, dealers and museums63 are most affected by the Mc-
Clain decision. This community is politically well connected,64 wealthy,
committed to the collection of antiquities and, as long as McClain remains
good law, subject to liability under civil and criminal law. For this reason,
legislative efforts to reverse McClain are likely to receive continuing sup-
port. The arguments for reversing the McClain decision and legislating a
restricted definition of stolen have some validity. However, in light of the
harm caused by the search for artifacts, the economics of the antiquity
market, and the nature of the common law theft rule, such a restrictive
definition should be opposed.
III. A RATIONALE FOR ENFORCING UMBRELLA OWNERSHIP
STATUTES
There are strong economic arguments for a rule that places liability on
purchasers. In addition, there are legal precedents that provide a model
for the enforcement of umbrella statutes by United States courts.
A. Economic Analysis
An economic analysis of the market for antiquities suggests that the
most effective means of slowing new thefts is to place liability for the
purchase of stolen antiquities on buyers. Under the common law, when an
object is stolen from an owner and sold to a third party, if the owner
locates the property and the thief is judgment proof 5 or otherwise un-
62. There are more than 500 museums in New York state. Id. Therefore, publication would not
necessarily render the stolen object quickly identifiable. The bill was vetoed by Governor Cuomo. See
supra note 54. He stated that the legislation did not "balance fairly the legitimate interests of foreign
countries in recovering their lost or stolen art work with the legitimate interests of museums or other
good faith purchasers of art." N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at C14, col. 3.
63. In hearings held in the Senate, the McClain opposition was dominated by collectors and mu-
seum curators. See generally 1986 Senate Hearings, supra note 54; 1985 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21; 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 1. When presenting S. 605 Senator Moynihan stated that
he was appearing "in some sense as chairman of the board of the Hirschorn Museum and Sculpture
Garden [located in Washington, D.C.]. . . . [which collects] pre-Columbian sculpture . . . ." 1985
Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 6. Others testifying in favor of S. 605 included Douglas Ewing,
President of the American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art. Thomas
Solley, the director of the Indiana University Art Museum proposed that "art-rich nations . . . pro-
tect their cultural patrimony through strict laws and enforcement." Id. at 123. He claimed that "[t]he
plea of poverty lacks credibility when one considers how effectively the Chinese have preserved their
heritage even through periods of extreme political upheaval." Id. Bernard Bothmer, a retired member
of the Brooklyn Museum made the oft-repeated argument that "it is this country and our allies in
Europe who are the true preservers of the cultural heritage of almost all countries of the ancient
world, and instead of discouraging the importation of relics of the past, I would encourage and ap-
plaud it .... " Id. at 133.
64. See J. H-ss, THE GRAND ACQUISITORs 2-4 (1974) (discussing illegal dealings at New
York's Metropolitan Museum of Art and fact that directors are extremely powerful individuals).
65. In this instance, a thief would be considered judgment proof if she did not have sufficient
funds to compensate the purchaser or could not be located.
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available, the third party purchaser must return the object to the original
owner without compensation. Under the common law rule, if the thief
was not judgment proof, the purchaser of the stolen property would still
have to return the stolen goods to the original owner. The purchaser,
however, could bring an action against the thief and obtain a damage
award equivalent to the purchase price of the property. The argument
underlying this rule is that third party buyers will be able to investigate
and police the market better than will owners victimized by theft. The
relevant question is how do we allocate risk to best prevent theft. 8
The economic framework for analyzing the theft rule can be applied to
the trade in stolen antiquities. 67 In the market for antiquities, the owners'
ability to protect against theft is particularly limited, while buyers can
generally investigate and avoid the purchase of stolen goods. There are
several reasons why the owner cannot prevent theft. The value of antiqui-
ties on the international market provides a strong incentive for theft.68
The source countries' level of development hinders their ability to protect
antiquities. Finally, many artifacts remain underground and a compre-
hensive system of policing the countryside would be needed in order to
prevent unauthorized looting.69
Thus, the antiquities market is an ideal case for strictly applying the
common law rule, and ensuring that an original owner, such as a source
country, will have a valid claim for the return of stolen antiquities.70 The
number of buyers of artifacts is few in comparison with the number of
antiquity sites.71 For this reason, it is more efficient to police the activities
of antiquity purchasers than to try to protect archaeological sites. Moni-
toring purchasers is less costly than protecting innumerable sites com-
monly located in inhospitable and inaccessible regions of the world. Thus
66. There has been considerable scholarly debate over whether a rule that places liability on the
owner or one that places liability on the buyer is the most efficient means of limiting theft. See A.
SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTr, supra note 55, at 476-79. For a comparative analysis of theft rules in
various countries see Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Pur-
chaser, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 43 (1987). What is important about this debate is the efficiency framework
used to determine who should bear the risk of theft and its application to the antiquities market.
67. For an expanded analysis of the economic principles of the theft rule see Levmore, supra note
66, at 45-49.
68. The price for artifacts in developing countries is much lower than what can be received for
these objects on the international market. See Craven, A Suggested Format for Funding the Preserva-
tion of Pre-Columbian Patrimony in the Americas, 11 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 425-26 (1984);
Wellborn, supra note 15, at 79.
69. Many of those sites which are known to contain valuable relics are located in remote areas. It
is difficult to prevent the looting of these sites. Furthermore, enforcement officials are frequently
bribed to ensure undisturbed excavation. See supra note 22.
70. This assumes that the country can demonstrate ownership, and that the applicable statute of
limitations has not expired.
71. In spite of the recent growth in the antiquity trade, the number of undiscovered sites and
buried ruins far exceeds the number of buyers and sellers of antiquities. There are innumerable sites
of known, and unknown, archaeological ruins located throughout the world. Every location of an early
settlement is a potential source of artifacts. The collection of antiquities, however, is limited to
wealthy collectors and museums in a few countries. Not only are there fewer collectors than sites, it is
far easier to locate and police their purchases than to protect the archaeological sites themselves.
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an efficient police system would concentrate on the behavior of purchasers,
instead of trying to protect the archaeological sites themselves.
Further justification for imposing liability on the buyers of antiquities
arises from the fact that these purchasers generally have the knowledge
and the resources to investigate the validity of an antiquity's title.72 Most
artifact-rich nations that have enacted blanket ownership statutes require
that all antiquities be registered.7  For antiquities exported after the pas-
sage of an umbrella ownership statute, the buyer can demand proof of
registration. Absent a registration document, the prospective purchaser
could request verification that the object had been exported from the coun-
try of origin prior to the enactment of applicable umbrella statutes.7 4 Col-
lectors will be able to avert the purchase of stolen antiquities by carefully
inspecting the "title" of antiquities that are for sale. By determining the
validity of items on the market, purchasers will deter sellers from dealing
in "stolen" works. The demand for stolen antiquities will diminish. Ac-
cordingly, the incentive for continued looting of archaeological sites will
decline.
B. Legal Analysis
The legal argument for enforcing a foreign nation's blanket ownership
declaration draws upon the concept of national ownership of American
artifacts articulated in the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979 (ARPA),75 judicial interpretation of state statutes that declare that
protected wildlife is owned by the state for purposes of applying the
NSPA,7 '6 and separation of powers concerns in the act of state doctrine.
72. A plausible argument can be made that buyers are also the best insurers. An efficient legal
rule will allocate liability to the party best situated to insure against the risk of loss. See A.
SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTT, supra note 55, at 476. The cost of insurance will vary depending on infor-
mation costs and the likelihood of theft. It will be difficult and expensive for countries to insure
against the theft of antiquities since source nations cannot protect existing sites and often do not know
where antiquities are buried. It will be less expensive for purchasers to insure because their collections
can be easily documented and better protected. Thus the efficient rule would place the risk of loss on
the buyer.
73. Mexico, concomitant with the enactment of umbrella statutes, required that all antiquities be
registered. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 993. If a country with an umbrella statute did not require existing
artifacts to be registered, it would be unfair to enforce the common law rule. A buyer would be unable
to determine whether an antiquity offered for sale was stolen.
74. The usefulness of a requirement that purchasers have proper documentation of an antiquity's
provenance is limited by the likelihood of fraud. It is common for export licenses to be forged. See
supra note 22. See also Kingdom of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. I W.L.R. 1120 (1986)
(discussing fraudulent documentation of Spanish export license for a painting by Goya). It would be
difficult, without the adoption of an international licensing system, to force a good-faith purchaser of
an antiquity with forged licenses to forfeit the work. The rule could, however, require purchasers to
exercise a high standard of care that would determine all but the most sophisticated forgeries.
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-ll (1982).
76. Analogies to the ARPA and state wildlife statutes have been articulated by Ely Maurer, As-
sistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1985 Senate Hearings supra note 21, at 43-47; Note,
supra note 26, at 327-28. These analyses have not recognized that umbrella ownership statutes are
not equivalent to more traditional forms of ownership.
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Further, United States courts have demonstrated a willingness to give spe-
cial consideration to the unique nature of the art market when applying
commercial transaction standards.
1. Recognition of Similar Statutes by United States Courts
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act is similar to an umbrella
statute. 7 This legislation provides that artifacts located above and below
the ground on public and Indian lands are national property. Anyone
found transporting these artifacts is subject to criminal sanctions under the
NSPA 8
If a looter unearthed a Hopi Basket from a gravesite on National Park
land and sold it to a dealer in New York, why would the Government's
claim to own this artifact be any more valid than Mexico's claim to own
pre-Columbian antiquities?"' The United States policy of protecting an-
tiquities is similar to that adopted by other source countries. Under the
ARPA, the United States declares itself owner of antiquities that have not
yet been discovered. It is true that the ARPA does not apply to artifacts
found on private property. However, the United States' ability to declare
national ownership and subsequently prosecute dealers in Indian artifacts
under the NSPA is analogous.80
The conservation laws enacted by Louisiana8' and Georgia,82 which as-
sert state ownership of alligators, are also similar to umbrella ownership
statutes. Like umbrella statutes, these laws are the sole basis of owner-
ship. Courts have found that the transportation of wildlife, which a state
claims to own based on a legislative decree, is a violation of the NSPA 3
The policy and reasoning behind these decisions is consistent with the
Fifth Circuit's decision to enforce Mexico's umbrella ownership statute in
McClain L84
77. McClain "gives effect to the ownership right of. . . [Mexico] . . . in the same way as the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act preserves national and native American ownership of re-
sources found to require special protection within the United States." 1985 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21, at 47 (testimony of Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 44.
80. The limited scope of United States' antiquity laws might be explained by the fact that there is
a sufficient domestic market for Indian artifacts such that umbrella statutes, designed to prevent the
export of antiquities, are unnecessary.
81. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56-3 (West Supp. 1986).
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3 (1986); see also Dept. of Natural Resources v. Keating, 238
Ga. 605, 234 S.E.2d 519 (1977) (upholding state ownership of wildlife).
83. United States v. Klapisch, No. 77-620, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 1978) (Louisiana's own-
ership of alligators grounds for holding that individual transporting alligator skins violates the
NSPA); United States v. Plott, 345 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (transporting alligators
trapped in Georgia violates NSPA).
84. As noted by Maurer, 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 21 and Note, supra note 26, at 331
& nn. 138-40, recognition of a country's ownership of artifacts would also be analogous to recognition
of the legal right nations possess in subsoil minerals. See generally G. HILL, TREASURE TROVE IN
LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT DAY (1936) (discussing fact that
many nations claim ownership of treasure buried in ground regardless of whether this land is pri-
19881
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 466
2. Act of State Doctrine
Under the act of state doctrine, United States courts refrain from ruling
on the validity of "public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power com-
mitted within its own territory."85 The doctrine is grounded in separation
of powers concerns. The judiciary may decide not to involve itself in eval-
uating the acts of a foreign state carried out within its own border because
of the potential for conflict with the executive's exercise of the foreign
affairs power.8 6 In the case of umbrella statutes, a court's nonrecognition
of such a statute may conflict with foreign policy goals of the executive
branch, including a wish to show support for the government of a particu-
lar country.87
The State Department, the Department of Justice and the United
States Information Agency oppose legislation that would reverse the Mc-
Clain decision.88 Many artifact-rich nations are located in sensitive geo-
political regions. Enforcing laws that seek to deter looting and the theft of
antiquities abroad is a simple and inexpensive method by which the
United States can build better relations with friendly governments in these
regions.89 The State Department also argues that it would be very diffi-
cult to justify to foreign governments the elimination of a presently availa-
ble remedy, one which follows from long standing common law principles
and which parallels relief expressly provided in the case of archaeological
resources declared to be the property of the United States.8
vately or publicly owned). These ownership claims do not depend on the state having a possessory
interest in that property. For example, if a state has nationalized oil and oil is then discovered on a
private citizen's land, and then shipped into the U.S., the oil will still be considered the property of
the country of origin. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 46 (testimony of Ely Maurer, Assis-
tant Legal Adviser, Department of State). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 41 comment d, illustration 8 (1965) (statute nationalizing oil
is an act of state).
85. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (judiciary will not ex-
amine validity of taking by foreign government within its own territory).
86. Id. at 412.
87. There are important government concerns in art-related issues. The act of state doctrine was
discussed in Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813, 825-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) in
which the Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar claimed that payments were due her following the
expropriation of two Durer paintings by the German government. The court held that the act of state
doctrine precluded an inquiry into the validity of the German government's action. Id. at 825. In so
holding, the court recognized that art-related transactions can become issues of great diplomatic sensi-
tivity, a finding which reinforced the court's desire to refrain from passing on the legality of West
Germany's act.
88. See 1986 Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 8-36 (statements of John C. Keeney, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal
Adviser, Department of State; Thomas E. Harvey, general counsel and congressional liaison, United
States Information Agency.)
89. See Constable, The Looting of Ancient Sites and the Illicit Trade in Works of Art, 10 J.
FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 482, 484 (1983).
90. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 47.
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3. Judicial Recognition of the Unique Nature of Art
United States courts have recognized the distinctive nature of the art
market and have modified legal standards accordingly." In Jeanneret v.
Vichey,92 the Second Circuit took the novel position that the illegal export
of a work of art could constitute a sufficient "cloud" on its title to render
the seller in violation of the implied warranty of title.9 The court's analy-
sis was unusual because illegal export usually does not affect an item's
title. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the art market is
particularly sensitive to allegations of impropriety, and thus the illegal
export of a work may prohibit its sale "to any reputable art-dealer or
auction house." 94
Similarly, a New York court adopted a unique standard of the "good
faith purchaser" 95 in a case involving a stolen work of art. In determining
whether a buyer has acted in good faith, the court traditionally compares
the buyer's actions with common industry practice. If the buyer acted in
accordance with acceptable standards, she is considered to have acted in
good faith. An exception to this rule was made in Porter v. Wertz.9" In
this case, a gallery that purchased a Utrillo painting claimed it had acted
in good faith, and that its failure to inquire into the work's title was con-
sistent with industry practice. The New York Supreme Court agreed with
the defendant that it was common for galleries not to inquire into an art
work's title. However, the mere fact that galleries usually do not investi-
gate title was not a sufficient ground for holding that the purchasers of the
Utrillo acted in good faith. Instead, the court held that the defendant's
argument confirmed the need for greater investigation by merchants as
"commercial indifference to ownership ... facilitates traffic in stolen
works of art."'97
91. "In many situations, the art aspect of a commercial transaction is treated as unique and not
within the broad provisions of the U.C.C." FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note 35, at § 9.2.8.
92. 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982).
93. Jeanneret, an established art dealer in Geneva, purchased a Matisse from Anna and Luben
Vichey. The painting had been previously held in Italy. After trying unsuccessfully to sell the paint-
ing in Europe, Jeanneret became aware that the Italian government was seeking the work on the
grounds that it had been illegally exported. She then sought to return the painting to the Vicheys, and
when they refused, brought suit on grounds of a breach of express and implied warranties of title. 693
F.2d at 260-61. The district court held that U.C.C. § 2-312 had been breached when the buyer was
faced with a claim on title by the Italian Government. Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 82-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that the claims made by the Italian government
prevented Jeanneret from selling the painting to any reputable art dealer or auction house and thus
this constituted a "heavy cloud" on title. 693 F.2d at 268. The court accepted a lesser standard for
showing a clouded title, modifying U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b). For discussions of this case, see Note, Jean-
neret v. Vichey: Sales of Illegally Exported Art Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 275 (1984); Comment, Jeanneret v. Vichey: Evaporating the Cloud, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. 999 (1983).
94. Jeanneret v. Vichey, 693 F.2d at 268 (footnote omitted).
95. The Code characterizes "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977).
96. 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979).
97. Id. at 149, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259; see also Taborsky v. Marony, No. 83-2533, No. 83-2560
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Courts were willing to adjust legal definitions in Jeanneret v. Vichey
and Porter v. Wertz to conform to the unique characteristics of the art
market. Similarly, in this instance, the nature of antiquities necessitates an
expansive definition of ownership and stolen. For this reason, courts
should follow the McClain and Hollinshead lead in adjusting the defini-
tion of ownership to recognize the validity of umbrella ownership statutes.
IV. TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF UMBRELLA STATUTES
Several important limitations must be overcome if the United States
courts' enforcement of umbrella statutes is to limit new thefts. First, as
critics of the McClain decision maintain, enforcement of these laws may
permit foreign countries to free-ride on United States enforcement mecha-
nisms. Second, museums and collectors fear that recognition of source
country ownership of antiquities may lead to an onslaught of litigation for
the return of works held in the United States for many years. Finally,
even if these obstacles are overcome, the effectiveness of this strategy may
be limited by the fact that the looting of artifacts is often a subsistence
occupation.
A. Monitoring Source Nations
The free-rider problem stems from the concern that instead of protect-
ing their own borders, source countries may rely exclusively on the prose-
cution of looters by the United States. Monitoring of artifact-rich nations
with umbrella ownership statutes could limit this problem. The United
States should insist that all countries claiming ownership of their cultural
patrimony enforce the umbrella laws within their borders. 8 The State
Department or an executive committee9" should be responsible for deter-
mining which countries are consistently enforcing their own umbrella
ownership statutes.1 00
Cr. 296 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 1984) reprinted in FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note 35, at § 9.2.4. (follow-
ing holding in Porter v. Wertz). But see Johnson & Johnson Prod. v. DAL Int'l Trading, 798 F.2d
100, 104 (3d Cir. 1986) (inquiry into reputation of seller not required by purchaser of grey market
goods).
98. To successfully enforce an umbrella statute, a source country must require, at the time the
umbrella statute is enacted, the registration of all antiquities held in private and public collections. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text. All antiquities exported after the umbrella statute was enacted
that are not registered can be considered stolen.
If a government did not have an effective registration program or did not otherwise enforce its own
umbrella statute, enforcement of these statutes by the United States would allow these countries to
free-ride on United States enforcement mechanisms.
99. An example of such a committee is the Cultural Property Advisory Committee set up in
accordance with the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) to make recommendations on
when the provisions of the act should be enforced. 19 U.S.C. § 2605 (1983). The CPIA is discussed
supra note 36.
100. United States courts and the Customs Service could then contact the United States monitor-
ing agency to determine whether a particular country is enforcing ownership laws and thus whether
the United States should enforce this country's umbrella statute. A model for this approach can be
found in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478,
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An optimal legal rule would encourage host countries to. use all avail-
able methods to limit exportation, provide incentives for buyers to police
the market by investigating the provenance of goods prior to purchase, 0 1
and enable foreign countries to prosecute importers of stolen artifacts. To
deter further free-riding it is necessary to promulgate a rule that forces
purchasers of stolen artifacts to forfeit these objects only when they are
worth more than a set value, for example $5,000. In this way, host coun-
tries have an incentive to restrict the export of antiquities, since there is no
way to recover objects worth less than $5,000. Moreover, liability for the
purchase of stolen antiquities is only placed on purchasers of expensive
artifacts. These buyers are best situated to determine if an antiquity has
been legally imported.'02
B. The Retroactive Effect of Umbrella Statutes
The United States should not enforce umbrella statutes retrospectively.
Antiquities removed from the country of origin prior to the adoption of
national ownership statutes would not be subject to civil or criminal action
in United States courts. This restriction sharply limits the scope of this
proposal. Artifact-rich nations will not be able to seek the return of some
of their most important "cultural property."' '° That umbrella statutes
will not be applied retroactively should reassure many of the museum di-
rectors and collectors who have lobbied for legislation to overrule Mc-
Clain. The Metropolitan Museum of Art need not fear that the calyx
krater, which some argue was looted from an important historical site,
416 A.2d 862 (1980). In this case the court held that an owner must act with "due diligence" in
seeking the return of stolen art in order to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 493. The case involved
the theft in 1946 of three small Georgia O'Keeffe paintings from a New York gallery operated by
O'Keeffe's husband, Alfred Stieglitz. O'Keeffe did not report the theft until 1972. The court reasoned
that as long as the owner acted diligently, her rights of title were preserved. The equitable principles
cited by the court in applying the discovery rule in this case are analogous to a broad acceptance of a
foreign government's claim to stolen antiquities. The discovery rule holds that in an appropriate case
a cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discovers the factual basis of the cause of
action. Id. at 491. Principles of adverse possession hold that one can acquire title to personal property
providing the possession is "hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and continuous." Id. at 494. The court
cited the difficulty of meeting this standard with works of art that are privately displayed in homes.
The situation is even more difficult in the antiquity trade, a market notorious for its clandestine
procedures. See Bator, supra note 5, at 290.
Developing countries should be held to a similar standard. As long as efforts are made to limit theft
and seek the return of stolen antiquities, a nation's umbrella ownership laws should be upheld. Under
this rule, if the country does not actively monitor the art market to locate stolen works, the statute of
limitations may bar their recovery of stolen antiquities.
101. See Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979).
102. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. One limitation of this proposal is that it could
result in the further breaking up of large antiquities into smaller units worth less than $5,000. There
is not, however, a clear relationship between the size of an antiquity and its value. In the few in-
stances where this rule may encourage further destruction of artifacts, such as in the case of a large
Mayan Stela, an exception to the rule could be made.
103. For example, the Greek government will not be able to obtain the return of the Elgin Mar-
bles from England. See generally Merryman, supra note 18 (discussing efforts to have British Mu-
seum return Elgin Marbles to Greece).
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will be returned to Greece. 04 United States recognition of artifact rich
nations blanket ownership of antiquities is primarily concerned with
preventing the recurrence of this pillage.
C. Subsistence Looting: An Intractable Problem
The recognition of source countries ownership claims by United States
courts will assist in halting the trade in stolen antiquities.0 5 In many
countries the looting of archaeological sites is a subsistence occupation.10
For this reason, it will be difficult to use legal sanctions to halt the activi-
ties of impoverished local populations. Furthermore, in many countries
with strict laws against the export of antiquities, administrative officials
willing to provide forged export certificates for antiquities dealers will cir-
cumvent the effect of these statutes. Since the United States will only en-
force the umbrella statutes of nations which consistently apply this legisla-
tion internally, indigenous corruption may prohibit the United States from
recognizing many countries' blanket ownership decrees.
In addition, many artifact rich countries have not passed umbrella own-
ership statutes. There will be an increasing incentive to trade in antiqui-
ties from those nations without blanket ownership laws. Furthermore, the
enforcement of umbrella statutes will only deter trade in stolen antiqui-
ties. Illegally exported works, that are not stolen, will continue to be mar-
keted without restriction.
V. CONCLUSION
American courts should recognize a strict common law rule, broadly
interpreting the property laws of artifact-rich countries. Enforcement of
this rule would enable courts to use the NSPA and common law replevin
to slow the trade in stolen antiquities. Such enforcement makes economic
sense. To the extent that it requires a modification of legal standards, it
can be analogized to similar legal changes made in other art-related areas.
The type of pre-purchase investigation that such a liability system would
encourage has already been adopted by a number of leading university
museums. 0 7 The success of these policies demonstrates the feasibility of
104. See K. MEYER, supra note 4, at 86-100 (discussing this Euphronios vase which the Italian
police claim was stolen from an Etruscan tomb).
105. The price of pre-Columbian art has dropped considerably, perhaps in response to the danger
of purchasing stolen antiquities since the McClain decision. The market in tribal art exported from
countries which either do not have umbrella statutes or have not sought to enforce them in United
States courts has not been affected. See Sotheby's, IMPORTANT TRIBAL ART (Nov. 18, 1986);
Sotheby's, PRE-COLUMBIAN ART (Nov. 24, 1986). In other instances, purchasers of antiquities have
refused to buy objects without detailed export and ownership information. See United States v. One
18th Century Columbian Monstrance, 797 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 837
(1986) (San Antonio Museum of Art concerned when seller of Monstrance asked Museum not to ask
Colombian Government about piece's export).
106. See L. PROTT & P. O'KEEFE, supra note 23, at 18, 369.
107. See, e.g., Biddle, New Directions: The Director Writes, EXPEDITION, Spring 1980, at 2 (pol-
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the legal rule that this interpretation of ownership would engender. The
trade in stolen antiquities continues to cause irreparable damage to the
historical record of artifact-rich nations. Recognition of umbrella owner-
ship statutes is the most effective means of deterring this illicit trade.
icy of the University of Pennsylvania Museum); Dixon, More Policy Statements on the Acquisition of
Art and Antiquities, 15 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 197 (1974) (policies of California State Univer-
sity, Long Beach, and University of California, Berkeley); Harvard University Approves Policy Gov-
erning Acquisition of Art Objects From Foreign Countries, 14 CURATOR 83, 87 (1971) (policy of
Harvard University Museum).
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